Further examination, however, led to a doubt as to the soundness of these views. Supposing that the British Government, influenced by these motives, decided to decline responsibility for these Trans-Salween States, what would become of them? Even Kengtung, the most powerful, could not stand alone. China and Siam might be invited to absorb them, and thus a belt of territory might be placed between our boundary and that of French dominion in Tonquin China. But China, it was believed, had no wish to increase her responsibilities in these regions, where her authority was very weak. Siam might be willing enough, but her rule would be feeble and unstable, and not welcome to the Shans. Both countries on this frontier were more likely to lose than to gain. If, with the view of avoiding the inconveniences that might arise from becoming conterminous with a great Western Power in these distant countries, we should invite Siam or China, or both, to relieve us of the charge of the Trans-Salween country, what security was there that either of these powers would retain the territory given to them? We might be creating the very conditions we wished to avert. The result of a cautious policy of this kind might be to make our dominion conterminous with that of France, not on or beyond the Mekong but on the Salween itself--an intolerable position. Looking at the matter from an administrative and local point of view, the Chief Commissioner was against stopping short of the frontier claimed by the King of Burma. It was argued that our new subjects, whether in Burma proper or in the Shan States, would not understand such a policy, and that it would have a bad effect on their feelings towards us. We might dignify it by the names of prudence and forbearance; they would ascribe it to fear and weakness. To them we should seem to have lifted a burden too heavy for our strength. We were afraid of going into places which the King had held and prepared for us. This, however, might be disputed, or treated as a question of sentiment. But the practical objections were evident and insuperable. [Illustration: THE EASTERNMOST POINT OF THE BRITISH-INDIAN EMPIRE. Reach of the Mé Khong where our boundary marches with French Indo-China.] Looking to the character of the country lying between the Salween and the Mekong, it was certain to be the refuge of all the discontent and outlawry of Burma. Unless it was ruled by a Government not only loyal and friendly to us, but thoroughly strong and efficient, this region would become a base for the operations of every brigand leader like Twet Nga Lu, or pretender such as Saw Yan Naing, where they might muster their followers and hatch their plots to raid British territory when opportunity offered. To those responsible for the peace and order of Burma such a prospect was not pleasant.