It was necessary to show the Chins that the arm of the British Government was long enough to reach them even in their mountain fortresses, and that our soldiers could remain in their country. It was decided, therefore, to keep the troops at Fort White during the rains and to prevent the Chins, who had not submitted, from rebuilding their villages or cultivating their fields. A rigorous blockade of the routes from their hills to the plains was ordered, in the hope that it would help to overcome their obstinacy. Nothing more could be done until the season for taking the field again came round. General Faunce's column had done all that men could do in a very difficult and unknown country against a very difficult enemy, pronounced by a man who had seen some fighting to be "the most difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought." The expedition was late in starting. The reason has been explained. That the next season's operations were more successful with less severity is no reproach to the General commanding the first expedition or to the political officer. Their work had made our power felt, and had given us some knowledge of the people. If a garrison had not been established at Fort White in 1888-9, it would have been scarcely possible to have acted against the Tashons on the plan which ensured success in 1889-90. CHAPTER XXII THE CHIN-LUSHAI CAMPAIGN General Faunce and his men had worked hard and well. By May, 1888, the advance had been made good as far as Tôklaing, called Fort White. But although that place was only a short distance (thirty miles) from Falam, the main settlement of the Tashons, we had not been able to reach it. This tribe was known to be the most numerous and the most influential of the Chins in these parts, and their subjugation was essential.