In the summer of 1889 the position at Fort White was hardly encouraging. The place had proved very unhealthy, and the garrison had few men fit for service. Not only had we failed to touch the Tashons, who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but we were far from having come to terms with the Siyins and Kanhows, on which tribes our hand had been heavy. The political officer, indeed, still believed that hunger would bring them in. The Kanhows had made a partial and half-hearted submission, retaining, however, most of their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate silence. Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had been thought. The Baungshès, moreover, to the south of the Tashons, including the Yokwa Haka and Thetta clans, had been continuously on the warpath, and had had no communication with our officers since the winter of 1887. There were only two courses open--either to make a well-prepared systematic advance into the Chin Hills and bring these people under British rule, not necessarily administration in the full meaning; or to retire altogether and leave an _enclave_ of savagery between Burma and Bengal, trusting for the protection of the Burman villages to frontier posts and spasmodic expeditions. The long history of the dealings of the Bengal Government with the Lushais and Nagas, very similar people, had proved the futility of the latter course. The inclination in Burma was all for the former, and this met with the thorough approval of the Supreme Government. The work was to be undertaken in a whole-hearted manner that would ensure success.