Not for a moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect how criminal is this programme of universal slavery. “War,” says Tannenberg, with his monstrous cynicism, “must leave nothing to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with. Modesty on our part would be purely madness” (_op. cit._, p. 304). Now, it is a fundamental truth, of which I should like to convince my readers, that the universal Pangerman plan is solely and wholly based on the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” which forms its backbone. If this is broken, the whole of the Pangerman plan falls to the ground, and the projects of Prussian domination are destroyed for ever. The principal problem which the Allies have to solve, if they wish to ensure their liberty and that of the whole world, is to make impossible the achievement of the plan “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” CHAPTER VI. THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM. I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” imposes on the Allies. II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hungary. III. All the racial elements necessary for the destruction of the Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe. I. Now that they have laid their hands on nine-tenths of the territories which they coveted (see p. 63), the Germans will only give in at the last extremity. Maximilian Harden has peremptorily declared: “Every means will be enthusiastically employed against her enemies by the German people. We will go back to the times of savagery when man was a wolf for his fellow man” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 9th February, 1916). In face of this firm resolution of the Germans to achieve at all costs the plan of universal domination, a plan of which the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project is the necessary and sufficient backbone, the real destruction of Prussian militarism becomes more than ever a duty. Only this result can repay the sacrifices of the admirable “Tommies” of the Allied armies. If they are determined to hold on as long as necessary, it is not to cover themselves with military glory; it is to acquire the certainty “that it shall not begin again, that their children shall not know horrors like those of the hellish struggle initiated by Prussianized Germany.” The Allies will certainly issue as conquerors from this dreadful war, but on condition that in future the struggle should be directed by the lessons of experience. These essential lessons are the outcome of the geographical, ethnographical, economic, and strategical elements which constitute the Pangerman plan of 1911, temporarily accomplished. Now, these lessons of experience show that the Allies could not possibly be content with a half-and-half victory; a complete victory alone can guarantee them against any aggressive revival, after peace, of Prussian militarism. The following considerations appear strongly to justify this opinion: