But there are higher considerations than even this, on which we should mistrust the expediency of such a plan. It does not appear, so far as we recollect, whether Mr. Glyn would repeal the provisions requiring the Bank to purchase all gold which may be presented at £3 17s. 9d. per ounce, and recur entirely to the measure of 1819; but we cannot see why, if the Bank Court are to have the sole responsibility of the amount of unrepresented notes to be held in circulation, they might not also be entrusted with the complete management of the issues on bullion, and, therefore, why the above provisions might not be altogether repealed. Now, whatever may be the defects of the Act of 1844, it is, we believe, disputed by few whose opinions are entitled to respect, that the operation of this part of the system has been in the main beneficial, and that on the whole the measure of 1844 has been a very great advance upon that of 1819. If however, Mr. Glyn only contemplated the issue of unrepresented notes, when he recommended entrusting the whole responsibility to the Bank Court, there still appear very serious objections to his proposal, taken even with this limitation. Amongst others we may again repeat what we have already strenuously insisted on, that it is time that the Bank of England should render some better equivalent than at present for the privilege of issue. But independently of this consideration, we do not consider that the course which the Bank Court has adopted at various periods throughout the past half century, has been sufficiently judicious to justify our entrusting so unfettered a capacity for good or evil to its care, even though guided in its decisions by the advice of any number of Commissioners appointed under Act of Parliament. A very considerable discretionary power must undoubtedly be confided to the Bank Directors, but we cannot perceive that past experience would justify the extension of that discretion to the absolute control either of the unrepresented issues or of the rate of interest. Thus, while we would place no absolute restriction upon the Bank, either with regard to the amount of its issues or to its rate of interest, we would certainly endeavour to devise such measures as would prevent the Bank, on the one hand, from exerting itself to keep too large an amount of unrepresented notes in circulation, and on the other, from loaning and discounting at too low a rate of interest, and thereby directly contributing to stimulate excessive speculation. And both of these objects we believe would be completely and judiciously effected through the adoption of the scale of charges already described; as the imposition of the minimum rate would necessarily prevent the rate of interest from falling too low in speculative periods, while the operation of the three ascending rates, as a whole, would produce a rise in the rate of interest directly proportionate to the efflux of gold and the increased demand for