We are strongly disposed to think that Mr. Glyn, Mr. Tooke, and several other leading opponents of the Act of 1844, have been carried too far in their objection to any system of regulations, through witnessing the mischievous effects of the inflexible restrictive clauses of that Act. So far as Mr. Tooke, however, is concerned, while shrinking from prescribing any absolute regulations on the subject of the currency, he has not omitted to offer some valuable suggestions as to the principles by which the Court of Directors should be guided in its management. He recommends that the average amount of bullion should be £12,000,000, the maximum being £18,000,000, and the minimum £6,000,000; and assuming 4 per cent. to be the average rate of interest, he supposes a drain to set in while the bullion is at its maximum. In such circumstances he would suffer the drain to reduce the gold to £12,000,000, and would then raise the rate of interest to 6 per cent., at which he would maintain it until the gold had fallen to £6,000,000, below which amount he does not consider it probable that the efflux would ever be likely to descend. In case it should exceed that point, however, he would then allow the Bank to take measures for its own security, by restricting its discounts or otherwise; but as soon as the bullion again amounted to £6,000,000, he would recur to the rate of 6 per cent. and would adhere to the same until the treasure should again attain its maximum of £18,000,000. If taken merely as a rough outline of the mode in which the Bank Directors should control their issues, we see little to object to in this plan of Mr Tooke’s, but in its specific details it would hardly bear a close examination. Its principal defect, perhaps, regarded under this aspect, consists in its appearing to recommend a series of violent transitions. We ran hardly think that its eminent proposer would suddenly raise the rate of interest from 4 to 6 per cent. at any particular stage in the efflux of bullion, or vice versa, or that he intended the preceding as other than an approximate statement of the mode in which the rate of interest ought to be raised in proportion as the drain proceeded. But apart from this consideration it seems somewhat inconsistent that, while he would strongly recommend the adoption of some such plan by the Directors, he would refrain from enacting any regulations that would have the tendency to ensure their practical adherence to it. Now, in this respect, we must, although reluctantly, dissent from the views of Mr. Tooke. We should not feel satisfied with merely advising the Bank Court as to the proper course to be pursued, and leaving the whole responsibility of so doing in their hands, but we would adopt such regulations as, while leaving them their own sphere of action sufficiently unfettered, would still impart a very sensible stimulus to their adoption of the proper course. For, while we admit that the Government has not the right to determine on