"4. Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be fixed in the Definitive Treaty. "5. Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms and munitions. "6. Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany with time limits for payment and delivery. "7. German property and territory to be held as security by the Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified. "8. Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations. "The President's obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to everything else. An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the adoption of the Covenant. The whole world wants peace. The President wants his League. I think that the world will have to wait." The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to the President's attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the United States and which he said he did not care to discuss. The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are those that I have continued to hold. The President was anxious to have the Treaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed rather than general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations. With that view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and the articles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion and unquestionably delay the peace. To restore the peaceful intercourse between the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce, and to give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resume their normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task to be accomplished. It was in my judgment superior to every other object of the Paris negotiations. Compared with it the creation of a League of Nations was insignificant and could well be postponed. President Wilson thought otherwise. We were very far apart in this matter as he well knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern.