The peace negotiations between the governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, and the representatives of the British government, which terminated in the peace concluded at Vereeniging on the 31st May, 1902Kestell, J. D. (John Daniel)
History
The peace negotiations between the governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, and the representatives of the British government, which terminated in the peace concluded at Vereeniging on the 31st May, 1902
Kestell, J. D. (John Daniel)
South Africa -- History; South African War, 1899-1902
I am referred to what I said about a year ago at the Warmbaths, but
let me remind you that, when I spoke there, the commando of that
division was 2,000 men strong. What is the situation there to-day? The
commando consists of only 480 men. I said then that the war must
continue till famine stared us in the face. Now I do not stand here to
dishearten anyone, but I must acquaint you fully with all
circumstances, and I tell you that there are districts in our country
where famine truly and actually stares the commandos in the face, and
many of the Delegates can testify to this. Our great strength always
lay in this, that we could keep a commando, however small, in each
district, which compelled the enemy to divide its enormous armies over
the entire country. But if we must give up portions of our country we
must trek to other parts; in other words, we must concentrate, and
therein lies great danger for us, because that will enable the enemy
to concentrate their large forces against us, and our fall will
speedily follow. Some say we can go to the Cape Colony. I also know
something about that. Chief Commandant de Wet could not get into the
Cape Colony in good times with good horses and with a large force. How
shall we get there, now that winter is approaching and our horses are
so poor that we can only ride at a walk, and the distance for most of
us is so much further? I tell you we shall not get there. On the way
there, most of the commandos will dwindle away.
The question is asked: "What will the future bring us if we
surrender?" Well, that is a most vital question, and for every
Africander who has done his duty, surrender is a terribly bitter cup.
But we must take the situation as it is, and, however bitter, we must
choose the better of two bad roads. It is maintained that we must
persevere, but unless we can do so for ten or twelve years, I do not
see any grounds for hoping that we shall be able to retain our
independence, and I do not see any chance whatever of keeping up the
struggle so long. What chance have we of persevering so long? If in
two years' time we have been reduced from 60,000 men to a fourth of
that number, to what number shall we have sunk in another two years? A
hopeless perseverance may also later bring us to a forced surrender,
which will be very fatal to us. Let us use our reason, and not stand
in relation to each other as two parties. Let us try to find a common
way. I shall remain in the field as long as fighting goes on.
Personally, I have no objection to persevere.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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