such activity transcends the single activities and their historical determination; its source is identified by him as Divine Providence. Such was the principle from which moved all Vico’s philosophy, and though Cuoco could not even suspect the speculative value of it, he realised it practically, and it was to him a luminous beacon, more than sufficient to enable him to take his bearings in the political world and make out the right way to rid Italy of her troubles. Thus he could not be satisfied with a French Constitution because Vico had taught that “governments must be drawn in conformity with the nature of the men who are to be governed....” The French Revolution seemed to him drawn for ideal men who did not exist. According to him a constitution must conform to the nature of the people and be produced by the people, through the few men who are fit to interpret its historical will and realise its particular requirements. Although Mussolini may not have read Cuoco’s articles it is greatly to his praise that he should so perfectly conform to the ideas of this first follower of Vico. Not that this fact is considered here as a coincidence—if Mussolini is the genius of Italy which he is hailed to be, it is but natural that he should realise in its practical application a theory which is so perfectly Italian. A constitution cannot be “good for every nation.” If it is supposed to be, it means it is good for nobody. Besides it must not be drawn like an abstract theory established once for all according to a philosophical notion of what is supposed to be the nature of man, and as such eternal; it is bound to be always temporary and historically determined, according to the vices and qualities, according to the ways and the history of the people.