The pedigree of fascism : $b A popular essay on the Western philosophy of politicsLion, Aline
Philosophy
The pedigree of fascism : $b A popular essay on the Western philosophy of politics
Lion, Aline
Italy -- Politics and government -- 1914-1945; Partito nazionale fascista (Italy); Political science; State, The
He strongly dislikes the taking of notes; for he does not want the
students to repeat his own words on the day of their examination.
The lectures are only meant to help them to take their bearings,
to enlighten them; they must read their set books by themselves
and interpret them by their own wits. His words must be taken as
an invitation to think out their own problems for themselves; he
wants to spur them on, not to solve problems for them. Thousands of
schoolmasters are actually following his pedagogy which so perfectly
meets the requirements of the present generation, that it is admirably
acted upon in the remotest villages and by people whose philosophy is
that of commonsense and good-will. Gentile has produced not only a
system of philosophy, but determined a current of spiritual life which
partakes both of theory and practice—blending them perfectly.
Just as Bruno, Bacon and Descartes opened the era of subjectivism,
individualism and liberty, so now Gentile opens a new era which is a
synthesis of law and liberty since he postulates the individual as the
relation of the empirical self to the transcendental self, since his
subjectivism becomes concrete and capable of realising the object. This
sounds somewhat abstruse and a few illustrations of the point at issue
may be useful.
Fuel is not fire, and in order to warm myself, fire is the thing I
need. But the fuel is necessary to the fire. The fire, indeed, _is_
only so far as it consumes the fuel. Both are necessary; yet it is
the fire which makes the fuel; since the coal, wood, or charcoal is
fuel merely because the fire can destroy it as such. But the fire does
not exist before it starts to consume the fuel. Now in knowledge the
thing man knows is not knowing, it is known; therefore, the principle
of knowledge is man. But can man know, in the absence of that which
he knows? Obviously not. Shall we then go back to the old dualism and
take man and the world, the subject and the object, as standing in
opposition again? No; a thing is an object of knowledge because the
subject postulates it as such and is therefore only in the act by which
the subject knows it. The one single source of _spiritual_ reality is
man; but he realises the world only in so far as he realises himself as
a knowing subject. And just as fire is fire as long as it destroys the
fuel; so man is really man, a spiritual being, a subject as long as he
acts as such. The point is often explained by practical illustration to
quite tiny children, to whom no one would try to state it, as I have
just done, theoretically.
Master: Why do you come to school?
Pupil: Because my mother sent me (—or—to learn to read and write.)
Master: If you come because your mother sent you, that is quite
right; but until you see for yourself why you should come to
school, you will get very little good out of it.
Pupil: But since I have got to come, I want to learn.
Master: And what do you suppose all the others come for?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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