Obviously all the difficulties of moral problems arise from an empirical conception of man and his relations to others. Empirically I am an individual, and as such in opposition not only to all material things, but equally to all the individuals to whom I assign a spiritual value, since all objects of experience, whatever their value, are not only distinct but separate from one another in such a way that each, by its own particularity absolutely excludes from itself all the rest. All moral problems arise from experience and arise precisely because of the absolute opposition in which the ego, empirically conceived, stands to other persons tormented by the supreme moral aspiration of our being that longs for a harmony in which we should become one with all others and with the whole world. This means that moral problems arise in so far as we become aware of the unreality of our being, as an empirical ego, opposed to other persons and surrounding things, and in so far as we come to see that our own life is actualised in the things opposed to it. But though this is the situation in which moral problems arise, they are solved only when man comes to feel another’s needs as his own, and thereby finds that his own life means that he is not closed within the narrow circle of his empirical personality, but is ever expanding in the activity of a mind superior to all particular interests and yet immanent in the very core of his personality. It must never be forgotten, however, that the reality of the transcendental ego, far from destroying the empirical ego, implies it.