The pedigree of fascism : $b A popular essay on the Western philosophy of politicsLion, Aline
Philosophy
The pedigree of fascism : $b A popular essay on the Western philosophy of politics
Lion, Aline
Italy -- Politics and government -- 1914-1945; Partito nazionale fascista (Italy); Political science; State, The
Utilitarianism is the first target on which Vico opens fire, and he
takes it as Hobbes and Spinoza had formulated it. Utility cannot be a
sufficient ground for morals since it springs from the temporal part
of man whilst morals are grounded on his eternal part. No principle
of utilitarianism, whatever the forms ascribed to it by philosophers,
can justify the process of differentiation, which is the constant
development of social organisations. Deceit, force, need, imply as
already in existence the society they are supposed to have produced.
How could the supposedly happy and simple first owners of the soil be
deceived into giving up their claims, if they had no desire whatever
and no relation of any kind. For relations imply some kind of social
state even if tacitly agreed upon. As to force, the first rulers were
not merely strong in their individual force; their power had a far
deeper root as they invariably appear at first as protectors of the
weak and as antagonists of all anti-social and destructive tendencies;
and their law was force indeed, but force _a natura præstantiori
dictata_. The real ground of society is, therefore, moral, and as such
essentially spiritual.
Yet at first sight Vico’s view of the origin of law and society
appears very much akin to that of “jus naturalism”; but as soon as
it is understood that Vico’s notion of man’s nature is the Christian
or spiritual one, then the difference is quite evident. Law to him is
natural to man because what is not natural can neither stay nor last.
Fear is certainly the origin of society; not, however, the mere fear of
wild beasts or hunger but the fear of oneself; fear of solitude due to
remorse and shame. Out of shame Vico sees arising the senses of honour,
fidelity, probity, trust in promises, truth in words, honesty in deeds.
So that society comes to have moral consciousness for its ground,
and one can indeed consider society as the realisation of man’s best
nature, of man’s spiritual conscience. This sense of shame or modesty
could be called by empiricism the sense common to all men that enables
them to realise without judgment what is necessary or useful to men. It
is through this sense of decency or shame that the moral consciousness
is enabled to embody itself in institutions and give stability and
certitude to the freewill of man which is of its nature most uncertain.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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