9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast--diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards--and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce. 10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas--to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn, [125] in order to go along the coast of the South--without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America--or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships of this [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España--just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce