28. There are many who restrict the powers of the sovereign which I mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, and who say that the [various] countries, when they instituted kings, did not dispossess themselves of all the authority which the people of the nation possessed; but that the latter reserved something, especially in the matter of taxes, which were proposed and demanded by the kings, while the vassals granted or denied them--[the objectors] drawing conclusions from this ancient method, and (especially in our España) from the convocation of parliament [cortes]; that the power of the king to grind his vassals is not absolute, and that these do not depend in such matters on the will of their kings alone. I frankly state these objections, which, even though they be paltry (on account of the positive opinion of the sovereign, supreme, and absolute power of our kings, who recognize no superior on earth), it is expedient for those who ought to anticipate them not to overlook; for, in order to render a question clear, and to foresee all the difficulties in its decision and practical result, a knowledge of the replies and objections which may be made is always helpful. I content myself with pointing these out, and repeating my [assertion of] invariable obedience to the royal commands of my king and sovereign, as I stated in the preceding section. 29. [Some] persons will also raise objections against what I have stated in the fifth section, that in all nations imposts and taxes are increased, according to their necessities and exigencies, and that, when this time [of urgency] is ended, the vassals are set free from such burdens; but that in España there is no impost which may not be perpetual, as has generally been the case with all--and the "Man of San Quintin" demonstrates it in his memorial, attributing the ruin of the monarchy to [the imposts,] the millones and sisas especially. [135]