and cause the military career to be held there in slight esteem;" (3) in future, no other officers except the heads of corps should be sent there from the Peninsula, so as to make room for promoting the lower officers, and to avoid demoralizing the young Spaniards; (4) that the Indian and mestizo sergeants or corporals who, after fulfilling their twelve years of all service, have to be replaced by Spaniards, shall be given places in the custom-house or revenue service, or in the monopoly shops, so as to recompense them for losing their posts.] In this manner the Indian soldier--who is docile, and always imitates the desires and opinions of his immediate superiors--will receive more disinterested treatment than he has hitherto had; he will make common cause with his leaders, in critical cases of popular revolutions; and the army will remain loyal and incorrupt in its opinions, always ready for its duty, and united in action and interests. Of the enlargement of the army of the islands The colonies are governed and maintained more by opinion, justice and example than by force of arms. When opinion in them becomes corrupted up to the point of forming great conspiracies, the offensive action of the army produces no other effect than to hasten the ruin of the legitimate government. [In the Filipinas Islands, the persuasions and example of the ministers of religion, and the measures taken by the civil authorities, have been usually sufficient to put down an uprising; but it is not well to rely too much on military force in such cases, since such action causes rankling resentment and unites the discontented in the common effort to throw off the yoke. It is impossible, in such a climate, to employ only Spaniards in the army, since they cannot endure it, and the expense of such an army would also be too great a burden on the royal treasury.] The army of Filipinas, then, ought not to have a greater force than is sufficient to defend and maintain, in any event, a post or locality that is impregnable, which can serve as a protection and defense to the government, its interests and employees, and the families of Spanish blood. A center of strength, ordered and disciplined, of this sort (the locality of which I will mention later), will be inaccessible not only to three millions of inhabitants who now people the islands, but to thirty millions who might inhabit them; and this idea alone in the mind of the Filipino Indian is the most efficacious for disconcerting, in its origin or progress, any plan for conspiring or taking by surprise. [In such a point of vantage, the government can use measures of policy,] which in revolutions are more effective than arms for reëstablishing order, without leaving in the minds of the people, as war does, deep feelings of resentment at being repressed; and the partial revolutions in the provinces will be always broken--as thus far have been those of Ilocos, Cebú, Bataan, and others--by the zeal