The Philippines: Past and Present (Volume 1 of 2)Worcester, Dean C. (Dean Conant)
History
The Philippines: Past and Present (Volume 1 of 2)
Worcester, Dean C. (Dean Conant)
Philippines; Philippines -- History -- 1898-1946
Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed
American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following
letter:--
"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of
the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)
"_Señor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]
"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving
warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your
personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I
assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,
"_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.
"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]
According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this
sort. He says:--
"The officers of the United States Army who believed that
the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American
movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío
del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding
at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him
that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2
and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold
their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards
should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana
to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American
soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]
Taylor continues:--
"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It
is not probable that these were the only two such letters
written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he
could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not
defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did
not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his
way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not
give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He
saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should
obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both
among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point
of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for
him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore
each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were,
occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the
Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing
that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the
Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he
saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo;
but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." [134]
The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown
by a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati
on August 10, 1898:--
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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