The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
such as are more particular: but such as being distributed into forms,
touch things subject to knowledge, are distant from one another, and
can by no means be copulated together, since they are excited by
different primary principles. One science, therefore, precedes all
sciences and disciplines, since it knows the common properties which
pervade through all the genera of beings, and supplies principles to
all the mathematical sciences. And thus far our doctrine concerning
dialectic[73] is terminated.
CHAP. V.
_What the Instrument is, which judges of the Mathematical Genera and
Species._
Let us now consider what that instrument is[74], adapted to the
judgment of mathematical concerns; and let us appoint Plato as our
guide in this affair, who, in his Republic, divides cognitions
separately from such things as are the objects of knowledge; and
distributes cognitions in conjunction with things subject to knowledge.
For of the things which are, some he ranks among intelligibles, and
others among sensibles. And of intelligibles, some are again pure
intelligibles, and others subject to cogitation. And of sensibles,
some are purely sensibles, but others conjectural. To intelligibles,
indeed, which are the first of the four genera, he assigns an
intelligible knowledge; but to those which are subject to cogitation,
he attributes thought: to sensibles, faith; but to conjecturals, a
conjectural or assimilatory power. And he shews, that the assimilatory
power has the same proportion to sense as thought to intelligence. For
the conjectural power knows the spectres of sensible forms, while they
are beheld in water and other bodies, which perspicuously represent
their image: since, by their situation in water, they are after a
manner, allotted the last seat in the gradations of forms, and truly
become the resemblances of resemblances. In like manner, thought
beholds the images of intelligibles in a degraded state, fallen from
primary simple and indivisible forms, into multitude and division.
Hence, a knowledge of this kind, depends on other more ancient
hypotheses; but intelligence arrives at that principle which is no
longer supposed. If then, mathematical concerns are neither allotted an
essence separate from all division and variety, nor that nature which
is apprehended by sense, which is obnoxious to many mutations, and is
in every proportion divisible, it must be manifest to every one, that
they are essentially subject to cogitation: but cogitation presides
over these as an instrument adapted to judgment, in the same manner as
sense to sensibles, and the assimilatory power to conjecturals. From
whence, indeed, Socrates determines that the knowledge of these is more
obscure than the first science, but is more evident than the impulsive
apprehension of opinion. For in this the mathematical sciences are
inferior to intelligence, because they contemplate that which is
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