The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent
propositions. For, indeed, he sometimes allows the soul, which is
constituted from mathematical reasons, to be the principle of motion:
and sometimes he affirms, that it receives its motion from genera
which are subject to intelligence. And these variations accord among
themselves. For to such things as are moved by another, the soul is a
certain cause of motion, but it is not the cause of every motion. After
the same manner, the mathematical science is indeed the second from the
first of all sciences, and, with reference to it, imperfect: but it
is, nevertheless, a science, not as being free from supposition, but
as knowing the peculiar reasons resident in the soul, and as bringing
the causes of conclusions, and containing the reason of such things as
are subject to its knowledge. And thus much for the opinion of Plato
respecting mathematics.
CHAP. XI.
But let us now consider what are the things which may be required of
a mathematician, and how any one may rightly judge concerning his
distinguishing peculiarities. For[83] Aristotle indeed, says, that
he who is simply learned in all disciplines, is adapted to judge of
all: but that he who is alone skilled in the mathematical sciences,
can alone determine concerning the magnitude of reasons inherent in
these. It is requisite, therefore, that we should previously assume
the terms of judging, and that we should know, in the first place,
in what things it is proper to demonstrate generally, and in what to
regard the peculiarities of singulars. For many of the same properties
reside in things differing in species, as two right angles in all
triangles: but many have indeed the same predicament, yet differ
in their individuals in a common species, as similitude in figures
and numbers. But one demonstration is not to be sought for by the
mathematician in these, for the principles of figures and numbers are
not the same, but differ in their subject genus. And if the essential
accident is one, the demonstration will also be one[84]: for the
possession of two right angles is the same in all triangles, and that
general something to which this pertains is the same in all, I mean
triangle, and a triangular reason. In the same manner, likewise, the
possession of external angles to four right ones, not only pertains to
triangles, but also to all right-lined figures; and the demonstration,
so far as they are right-lined, agrees in all. For every reason brings
with it, at the same time, a certain property and passion, of which all
participate through that reason, whether triangular, or rectilinear, or
universally figure. But the second limit by which a mathematician is
to be judged, is, if he demonstrates according to his subject-matter,
and renders necessary reasons, and such as cannot be confuted, but are
at the same time neither probable, nor replenished with a similitude
of truth.
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