subsisting in one reason, but differing in magnitudes or subjects: in like manner, there is a common something in the circles, which subsist in the receptacle of the phantasy, of which all its circles participate, and according to which they all possess the same form; but in the phantasy they possess but one difference only, that of magnitude. For when you imagine many circles about the same centre, they all of them exist in one immaterial subject and life, which is inseparable from a simple body, which, by the possession of interval, exceeds an essence destitute of parts; but they differ in magnitude and parvitude, and because they are contained and contain. Hence, that universal is twofold, which is understood as subsisting in the many: one, indeed, in sensible forms; but the other in such as are imaginative. And the reason of a circular and triangular figure, and of figure universal, is twofold. The one subsisting in intelligible, but the other in sensible matter. But prior to these is the reason which resides in cogitation, and that which is seated in nature herself. The former being the author of imaginative circles, and of the one form which they contain; but the other, of such as are sensible. For there are circles existing in the heavens, and universally those produced by nature, the reason of which does not fall under a cogitative distribution. For in incorporeal causes, things possessing interval, are distinguished by no intervals: such as are endued with parts, subsist without parts: and magnitudes without the diffusion of magnitude, as on the contrary in corporeal causes, things without parts subsist divisibly, and such as are void of magnitude with the extension of magnitude. Hence, the circle resident in cogitation, is one, simple and free from interval: and magnitude itself is there destitute of magnitude; and figure expressed by no figure: for such are reasons separate from matter. But the circle subsisting in the phantasy, is divisible, figured, endued with interval, not one only, but one and many, nor form alone, but distributed with form. And the circle, in sensible objects, is composite, distant with magnitude, diminished by a certain reason, full of ineptitude, and very remote from the purity of immaterial natures. We must therefore say, that geometry, when it asserts any thing of circle and diameter, and of the passions and affections which regard the circle; as of contacts, divisions, and the like: neither teaches nor discourses concerning sensible forms, (since it endeavours to separate us from these), nor yet concerning the form resident in cogitation, (for here the circle is one, but geometry discourses of many, proposing something of each, and contemplating the same of all: and here it is indivisible, but the geometric circle is divisible); but we must confess, that it considers universal itself; yet as distributed in imaginative circles. And that it beholds, indeed,