The Philosophical Theory of the StateBosanquet, Bernard
Philosophy
The Philosophical Theory of the State
Bosanquet, Bernard
Political science -- Philosophy; State, The -- Philosophy
Associates, [1] we saw, were together, as might roughly be said,
simply because they found themselves together. That is to say, they
were, after their association, what they were before it, and would
not be seriously affected if they were to be separated. Connections
of this kind are essentially between unit and unit. They fall short
of the nature of a plan which determines a great range of elements,
variously but with reference to an identical operation.
[1] An “Association,” it may be urged, generally has a definite
purpose, and so far, as indeed we said above, the associates come
together, and do not merely find themselves together. But this is
only an apparent difficulty. In comparison with the whole compass
of their nature, associates who come together for some limited
purpose--Bimetallism, Philanthropy, a political cause--do merely
find themselves together. They form, as the cynic will say, an
extraordinary menagerie, and their association may break up without
any apparent effect upon their nature. Obviously, however, there are
some purposes which go deeper into men’s characters, and others which
are shallower; and this merely illustrates our point that the most
casual association is a universal connection of qualities in disguise.
Beginning, as before, with the connection between {160} persons,
we may illustrate the difference by the comparison between a crowd
and an army. The mind of a crowd has indeed been taken as the type
of a true social mind. But it is really something quite different.
It is merely the superficial connection between unit and unit on an
extended and intensified scale. As unit joins unit in the street,
each determines his immediate neighbours, and is determined by them
through the contagion of excitement, and with reference to the
most passing ideas and emotions. What acts upon them in common is
necessarily what there is in common between persons meeting, as it
were, for no reason, and not knowing what they share beyond what they
immediately see and feel. The crowd may indeed “act as one man”; but
if it does so, its level of intelligence and responsibility will,
as a rule, be extraordinarily low. It has nothing in common beyond
what unit can infect unit with in a moment. Concerted action, much
more reasoning and criticism, are out of the question. The doing or
thinking of a different thing by each unit with reference to a single
end is impossible. The crowd moves as a mere mass, because its parts
are connected merely as unit with unit. Any form of connection which
could effect an organisation in the whole would make a demand on
the nature of every unit, which, where their conjunction is merely
casual, could not possibly be met.
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