the individual is apt to become a rolling stone with no assignable place--indeed “gathering no moss”--and to pass through his positions and relations as if they were stations on a railway journey. But in truth it is only simplified and not falsified. If we look with care we shall see that it, or nothing, is true of all lives. [1] I do not say merely social functions, _i.e._ functions dealing directly with “others” as such. {206} The Position, then, is the real fact--the vocation, place or function, which is simply one reading of the person’s actual self and relations in the world in which he lives. Having thoroughly grasped this primary fact, we can readily deal with the points of view which present the position or its incidents in the partial aspects of rights or obligations. (i.) A right, we said, is a _claim_ recognised by society and enforced by the State. My place or position, then, and its incidents, so far as sanctioned by the State, constitute my rights, when thought of as something which I claim, or regard as powers instrumental to my purposes. A right thus regarded is not anything primary. It is a way of looking at certain conditions, which, by reason of their relation to the end of the whole as manifested in me, are imperative alike for me and for others. It is, further, the particular way of looking at these conditions which is in question when I claim them or am presumed to claim them, as powers secured to me with a view to an end which I accept as mine. I _have_ the rights no less in virtue of my presumed capacity for the end, if I am in fact indifferent to the end. But, in this case, though attributed _ab extra_ as rights, they tend to pass into obligations. (ii.) If rights are an imperative “position” or function, when looked at as a group of State-secured powers claimed by a person for a certain end, obligations are the opposite aspect of such a position or group of powers. That is to say, the conditions of a “position” are regarded as obligations in as far as they are thought of as {207} requiring enforcement, and therefore, primarily, from the point of view of persons not directly identified with the “position” or end to which they are instrumental. Rights are claimed, obligations are owed. And _prima-facie_ rights are claimed _by_ a person, and obligations are owed _to_ a person, being his rights as regarded by those against whom they are enforceable.