The Philosophical Theory of the StateBosanquet, Bernard
Philosophy
The Philosophical Theory of the State
Bosanquet, Bernard
Political science -- Philosophy; State, The -- Philosophy
But no right can be founded on my mere desire to do what I like. [1]
The wish for this is the sting of the claim to unrecognised rights,
and this wish is to be met, as the fear that our view might lead
to despotism was met. The matter is one of fact and logic, not of
fancies and wishes. If I desire to assert an unrecognised right, I
must show what “position” involves it, and how that position asserts
itself in the system of recognitions which is the social mind, and my
point can only be established universally with regard to a certain
type of position, and not merely for myself as a particular A or B.
In other words, I must show that the alleged right is a requirement
of the realisation of capacities for good, and, further, that it
does not demand a sacrifice of capacities now being realised, out
of proportion to the capacities which it would enable to assert
themselves. I must show, in short, that in so far as the claim in
question is not secured by the State, Society is inconsistent with
itself, and falls short of being what it professes to be, an organ
of good life. And all my showing gives no _right_, till it has
{214} modified the law. To maintain a right against the State by
force or disobedience is rebellion, and, in considering the duty of
rebellion, we have to set the whole value of the existence of social
order against the importance of the matter in which we think Society
defective. There can hardly be a duty to rebellion in a State in
which law can be altered by constitutional process.
[1] Green, _Principles of Political Obligation_, p. 149.
The State-maintained system of rights, then, in its relation to the
normal self and will of ordinary citizens with their varying moods of
enthusiasm and indolence, may be compared to the automatic action of
a human body. Automatic actions are such as we perform in walking,
eating, dressing, playing the piano or riding the bicycle. They have
been formed by consciousness, and are of a character subservient to
its purposes, and obedient to its signals. As a rule, they demand
no effort of attention, and in this way attention is economised
and enabled to devote itself to problems which demand its intenser
efforts. They are relegated to automatism because they are uniform,
necessary, and external--“external” in the sense explained above,
that the way in which they are required makes it enough if they are
done, whatever their motives, or with no motives at all.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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