The Philosophical Theory of the StateBosanquet, Bernard
Philosophy
The Philosophical Theory of the State
Bosanquet, Bernard
Political science -- Philosophy; State, The -- Philosophy
So it is with punishment. Primarily, no doubt, chastisement by pain,
and the appeal to fear and to submissiveness, is effective through
our lower nature, and, in as far as operative, substitutes selfish
motives for the will that wills the good, and so narrows its sphere.
But there is more behind. The automatic system is pulsing with the
vitality of the end to which it is instrumental; and when we kick
against the pricks, and it reacts upon us in pain, this pain has
subtle connections throughout the whole of our being. It brings us
to our senses, as we say; that is, it suggests, more or less, a
consciousness of what the habitual system means, and of what we have
committed in offending against it. When one stumbles and hurts his
foot, he may look up and see that he is off the path. If a man is
told that the way he works his factory or keeps his tenement houses
is rendering him liable to fine or imprisonment, then, if he is an
ordinary, careless, but respectable citizen, he will feel some thing
of a shock, and recognise that he was getting {226} too neglectful
of the rights of others, and that, in being pulled up, he is brought
back to himself. His citizen honour will be touched. He will not like
to be below the average which the common conscience had embodied in
law.
When we come to the actual criminal consciousness, the form which
the recognition may take in fact may vary greatly; and as an extreme
there may be a furious hostility against the whole recognised
system of law, either involving self-outlawry through a despair of
reconciliation, or arising through some sort of habitual conspiracy
in which the man finds his chosen law and order as against that
recognised by the State. [1] But after all, we are dealing with a
question of social logic and not of empirical psychology. And it must
be laid down that, in as far as any sane man fails altogether to
recognise in any form the assertion of something which he normally
respects in the law which punishes him (putting aside what he takes
to be miscarriage of justice), he is outlawed by himself and the
essentials of citizenship are not in him. Doubtless, if an uneducated
man were told, in theoretical language, that in being punished for
an assault he was realising his own will, he would think it cruel
nonsense. But this is a mere question of language, and has really
nothing to do with the essential state of his consciousness. He would
understand perfectly well that he was being served as he would say
anyone should be served, whom he saw acting as he had done, in a case
where his own {227} passions were not engaged. And this recognition,
in whatever form it is admitted, carries the consequence which we
affirm.
[1] See the account of the Mafia in Marion Crawford’s _Corleone_.
Accepting this as described, it simply is the social will in which
the population of a certain region find their substitute for the
State.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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