The Philosophical Theory of the StateBosanquet, Bernard
Philosophy
The Philosophical Theory of the State
Bosanquet, Bernard
Political science -- Philosophy; State, The -- Philosophy
4. Within the whole fabric of right or realised will, the element
which naturally asserts itself by antagonism to the letter of the
law is the morality of conscience, conscientiousness, or the idea of
the Good Will. It is connected with the letter of the law, as Hegel
puts it, by the various degrees of wrong. The will, that is to say,
finds itself at variance in or with [1] the order of law and property
which it has created as its direct and necessary step to freedom. Its
realised theory, so to speak, is found to break down at a certain
point, by being in contradiction with the needs which it was created
to meet. “_Summum jus, summa injuria_”. We may object that the
anti-legal will is simply wrong. This may be so, and again it may
not be so. What the will has awakened to, whether right or wrong, is
{263} that it can acquiesce in nothing which does not come home to it
as fulfilling its own principle. What so comes home to it is what it
calls “good,” and it cannot accept any order or necessity which it
cannot will as good, _i.e._ as satisfying its own idea.
[1] “In it,” when my will does not conflict with right as such, but
claims the right in an object A to be mine and not yours--a civil
dispute. “With it,” when my will rebels, and by its act, so far as
in it lies, denies and destroys the whole fabric of right, _e.g._
takes the object A, without alleging a right to it--theft, a criminal
offence, cf. p. 230.
When this phase of reaction is pushed to its logical extreme, we
have the modern doctrine of my conscience and my pure will. It is
the conflict of the inner self with the outer world, expressed in
history through the Stoic and through some forms of the Christian
consciousness (especially the Protestant consciousness), and in
philosophy through the Kantian doctrine of the good will, uttered in
the famous sentence, “Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world
or out of it which can be called good without qualification except
a good will.” [1] Nothing is worth doing but _what_ one ought, and
_because_ one ought.
[1] Kant, _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik d. Sitten_, sect. I.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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