The Philosophical Theory of the StateBosanquet, Bernard
Philosophy
The Philosophical Theory of the State
Bosanquet, Bernard
Political science -- Philosophy; State, The -- Philosophy
The division of functions in the State is a necessary condition of
its rational organisation. But, as Rousseau had insisted, it is
altogether false to regard these separate functions as independent,
or as checks on one another. There could be no living unity, if the
functions of the State were ultimately independent and negative
towards each other. Their differentiation is simply the rational
division of labour. The State is an image of a rational conception;
it is “a hieroglyph of reason.”
Sovereignty, therefore, resides in no one element. It is,
essentially, the relation in which each factor of the constitution
stands to the whole. That is to say, it resides only in the organised
whole acting _qua_ organised whole. If, for example, we speak of the
“Sovereignty of the People” in a sense opposed to the Sovereignty of
the State--as if there were such a thing as “the people” over and
above the organised means of expressing and adjusting the will of the
community--we are saying what is, strictly speaking, meaningless.
It is just the point of difference between Rousseau’s two views. We
saw that Rousseau clearly explained the impossibility of expressing
the general {283} will except by a determinate system of law.
But what he seemed to suggest, and was taken to mean, by popular
Sovereignty, was no doubt just the view which Hegel condemns. It is
essentially the same question as how a constitution can be made.
Strictly, a constitution cannot be made except by modification of
an existing constitution. If, to put a case, you have a multitude
new to each other in some extra-political colony, they must assume
a constitution, so to speak, before they can make one. Law and
constitution are utterances of the spirit of a nation.
The form of State which Hegel analyses is a modern constitutional
monarchy, with an executive (ministers sitting in the chambers, as
he is careful to urge) and Chambers or Estates representing the
classes developed in the civic community. Representation, he urges,
is of bodies or interests rather than of masses of individuals, and
the Corporations or Trade Societies have also an important place
directly, by their touch with the departments of the executive
government. [1] The general principle is, as indicated above, that
the problems of connection between considerable particular interests
and the universal interests of the community are, so to speak,
prepared on the ground of the Corporation and Bourgeois Society for
a solution in the interest of the common good by the Legislative and
the Executive Government.
[1] Much as through inspectors and commissions the opinion of Trade
Unions, Friendly Societies, and Co-operators is elicited by our
Government Departments with a view to legislation, independently of
the House of Commons.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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