The Philosophical Theory of the StateBosanquet, Bernard
Philosophy
The Philosophical Theory of the State
Bosanquet, Bernard
Political science -- Philosophy; State, The -- Philosophy
We need not enter at length upon the question whether the good
which extends beyond oneself {110} is adequately described as the
good which is general or common to oneself and others. It is plain
that the unity of myself with others in a common good is the same
in principle as the unity of myself with myself which I aim at in
aiming at my own good. Thought and language, we should bear in mind,
unite me to myself just as they unite me to others, and they expand
my being by binding my own life into a whole no less than by making
intercourse possible between my fellow men and myself. Just so, the
good at which I aim extends beyond my trivial or momentary self--that
is to say, is universal as against myself as particular--in ways
which are not _prima facie_ exhausted by saying that they include the
good of others. But again, just like thought and language, the good
which enables me to enter deeper into communion with myself or with
the world must always have an aspect of extending that communion to
others; and therefore, for the purposes of social philosophy, we may
treat the universal good or self as also in its nature a general or
common good or self. It is that at least, though it may be more, in
accordance with the logical relation between the rational universal,
and the numerical generality.
This indestructible impulse towards the Good, which is necessarily
a common good, the substantial unity and filling of life by the
interests through which man is human, is what Rousseau plainly has
before him in his account of the General Will. But it has rightly
been observed [1] that he did not really distinguish this conception,
analogous as it is to what Plato or Aristotle might have said {111}
of the “divine reason which is the source of the laws and discipline
of the ideal polity,” from the legal idea of the sovereign “in the
sense of some power of which it could reasonably be asked how it was
established in the part where it resides, when and by whom and in
what way it is exercised.” We will point out, however, the negative
and positive indications which he furnishes as to where it is not and
where it is to be looked for. That he fails to emancipate himself
from the fallacies which he acutely indicates is a phenomenon for
which the reader is, I trust, sufficiently prepared.
[1] Green, _Principles of Political Obligation_, p. 82.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account