Comte does not think so. This applied logic does not appear to him
to be more indispensable than formal logic. In the first place, the
former, in fact, supposes the latter. It proceeds from the same
philosophical conception. In order to determine _a priori_, in a
general way, the rules of the application of the mind to its various
scientific objects, we should first have to possess a knowledge of the
laws of the mind. But, according to Comte, this knowledge can only be
obtained by the observation of the methods which the mind has indeed
followed. Moreover, no art is taught abstractedly, not even the art
of reasoning well, nor that of experimenting, of finding hypotheses,
etc. It has never been sufficient to know the rules of versification
in order to write true poetry. A deep knowledge of the rules of method
will not lead to scientific discoveries.[85] Whatever we learn of an
art, it is practice that has taught us. Nothing here can replace time,
natural disposition, and experience.
Methods then cannot be studied apart from the positive researches in
which men of learning make use of them. Even supposing that in the
far future, when the sciences are advanced, the methods and their
applications could be taught by themselves, the study would run a great
risk of yielding poor results.[86] Up to the present time all that has
been said of the method, considered in the abstract, reduces itself
to vague generalities. When, in logic, we have thoroughly established
that all our science of nature must be founded upon observation, that
we must proceed sometimes from facts to principles, sometimes from
principles to facts, and a few other similar aphorisms, we know far
less of the method than the man who has studied a single one of the
positive sciences somewhat deeply, even without any philosophical
purpose. It is thus that Eclectic philosophers have imagined to make
their psychology into a science, thinking they could understand and
practice the positive method because they had read the _Novum Organum_
and the _Discours de la Méthode_. But did not Bacon, Pascal, Descartes,
and the other great scientific leaders insist on the uselessness of
abstract considerations about method? They never separated the rules
they formulated from their application to positive research.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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