that is, the subsequent conversation, and the arrangements between the
two friends may be entirely different.
Putting this argument in abstract form we may say, generally, that
two stimuli, which are, in the physical sense, entirely different
from each other, may produce absolutely the same series of reactions;
and conversely two stimuli differing from each other in quite an
insignificant degree may produce entirely different reactions. It is
also easy to see, by analysis of the antecedents to the actions of the
intelligent animal, that these stimuli are, in the majority of cases,
not elemental physical agencies, but individualised and integrated
groupings of these agencies; and that the animal reacts, not to their
mathematical sum, as it should do on a purely mechanistic hypothesis
of action, but to the typical wholes which are expressed in these
groupings.[22]
[22] Thus to the ordinary woman the sight of a cow in the middle of a
country road produces a certain definite feeling of apprehension, which
is always the same although the optical image of the animal differs
remarkably in different adventures.
It is no answer to this argument to say that it is not the actual
atmospheric vibrations (in the case of the conversation), nor the
optical image (in the case of the recognition of a friend), which
are the true stimuli, but rather the mental conditions, or states of
consciousness, aroused by these physical agencies. If we are to adopt
a strictly mechanistic method of explaining actions, such a method as
that indicated by Loeb’s hypothesis of the purely tactic behaviour
of his caterpillars, then these atmospheric vibrations and optical
images are most undoubtedly the true stimuli, and the reactions
must be functions of them in the mathematical sense. But since
this strict functionality does not exist in any behaviour-reaction
closely analysed, we must grant at once that it is, indeed, _not_ the
physical series of events that determines the actual response, but
truly the conscious state immediately succeeding to these physical
sense-impressions. Now let us see to what conclusions this admission
leads us.
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