The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's AesthetikHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Aesthetics
series of fact. No doubt the entirety of the facts of life, its actions
and fatalities, tends to make the individual what he is; but for all
that his true nature, the real core of his thoughts and capacities, is
manifested in _one_ great situation and action independently of them.
It is the progress of these which reveals to us really what a character
is made of, a character which previously to their occurrence had been
known merely in a nominal way, that is the name of one more fact among
the external facts of experience.
We must therefore not look for the commencement of the action in that
_empirical_ source of it; we must rather centre the attention upon
those circumstances which have taken a hold upon the particular nature
with which we are dealing, and created or satisfied its needs; we
must, in fact, reveal the particular collision in whose conflict and
resolution the action in question consists. Homer, for example, in the
"Iliad," makes a start at once with the particular fact on which his
entire epic is founded, that is to say, with the wrath of Achilles.
He tells us nothing of earlier history of the life of Achilles, but
emphasizes at once the critical collision, and, moreover, does it in a
way which unfolds a background of the greatest interest to his picture.
The representation, then, of the action as a process complete in
itself, in which action, reaction, and resolution are constituent
elements, is, above all, the function of the poetic art; all the other
arts can at most only seize upon and secure in their presentation
one moment of this process. It is quite true that if we direct our
attention to that aspect of the medium they employ which is richest,
they may appear to have an advantage over poetry; in painting
especially[324] we find a control asserted not merely over the entire
external form, but also over the expression of external demeanour and
the play of such relatively to other objects grouped around it. Such a
means of expression, however, cannot compare as an interpreter of truth
with human speech. The action itself is the clearest means of unfolding
to us individual character, whether we view it relatively to the entire
emotional life[325] or the objects of mind. All that a man is at the
very root of his nature is first revealed to us through his acts; and
action, for the reason that it is an expression of spirit, finds its
ultimate expression as such most clearly and concisely in speech alone.
When we speak in general terms of human action we are apt to figure to
ourselves an incalculable variety of mode. For Art, however, the sphere
of action suitable to artistic representation is, generally speaking,
limited. Her province is wholly restricted to the type of action which
is conformable to the necessary configuration of the Idea.
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