The Philosophy of Friedrich NietzscheMencken, H. L. (Henry Louis)
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
Mencken, H. L. (Henry Louis)
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900; Philosophy, German -- 19th century
Again, the scientific method tends to increase our knowledge by the
very fact that it discourages unreasoning faith. The scientist realizes
that most of his so-called facts are probably errors and so he is
willing to harbor doubts of their truth and to seek for something
better. Like Socrates he boldly says "I know that I am ignorant." He
realizes, in fact, that error, when it is constantly under fire, is
bound to be resolved in the long run into something approximating the
truth. As Nicolas pointed out 500 years ago, nothing is utterly and
absolutely true and nothing is utterly and absolutely false. There
is always a germ of truth in the worst error, and there is always a
residuum of error in the soundest truth. Therefore, an error is fatal
only when it is hidden from the white light of investigation. Herein
lies the difference between the modern scientist and the moralist. The
former holds nothing sacred, not even his own axioms; the latter lays
things down as law and then makes it a crime to doubt them.
It is in this way--by submitting every idea to a searching, pitiless,
unending examination--that the world is increasing its store of what
may be called, for the sake of clearness, absolute knowledge. Error
always precedes truth, and it is extremely probable that the vast
majority of ideas held by men of today--even the sanest and wisest
men--are delusions, but with the passing of the years our stock of
truth grows larger and larger. "A conviction," says Nietzsche, "always
has its history--its previous forms, its tentative forms, its states of
error. It becomes a conviction, indeed, only after having been _not_
a conviction, and then _hardly_ a conviction. No doubt falsehood is
one of these embryonic forms of conviction. Sometimes only a change
of persons is needed to transform one into the other. That which, in
the son, is a conviction, was, in the father, still a falsehood."[5]
The tendency of intelligent men, in a word, is to approach nearer
and nearer the truth, by the processes of rejection, revision and
invention. Many old ideas are rejected by each new generation, but
there always remain a few that survive. We no longer believe with
the cave-men that the thunder is the voice of an angry god and the
lightning the flash of his sword, but we still believe, as they did,
that wood floats upon water, that seeds sprout and give forth plants,
that a roof keeps off the rain and that a child, if it lives long
enough, will inevitably grow into a man or a woman. Such ideas may be
called truths. If we deny them we must deny at once that the world
exists and that we exist ourselves.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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