The Philosophy of Giambattista VicoCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
Croce, Benedetto
Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744
quiescence has no degrees; extended things are corruptible, unextended
things permanent in their indivisibility; body can be divided, mind
cannot; possibilities are at a single point, accidents are everywhere;
science is one, while opinion produces differences; virtue is neither
in one place nor another, vice walks up and down in every direction;
the good is one, the bad is innumerable; in every kind of thing in a
word the best occurs in the category of the indivisible.
Substance in general, which underlies and sustains things, is divided
into two species, extended substance or that which equally supports
unequal extensions, and thinking substance which equally supports
unequal thoughts. And just as one part of extension is divided from
another but indivisible in the substance of the body, so one part of
thought, that is to say a determinate thought, is divided from another
but indivisible in the substance of the soul. Activity or freedom is
peculiar to the soul, and entirely denied to body: and Descartes, in
making a conation of body the beginning of his physics, was strictly
adopting the methods of a poet and falling into the anthropomorphic
conceptions of primitive races. The phenomena which students of
mechanics call activities, forms, or powers, are insensible movements
by which bodies move either, as the ancients said, towards their
centres of gravity, or, as the modern theory of mechanics asserts, away
from their centre of motion. The communication of motion, moreover,
is just as inconceivable in body as is activity. To grant it would be
equivalent to granting the interpenetration of bodies, since motion
is nothing but matter in motion; the blow given to a ball is only the
occasion for the energy of the universe, which was so weak in the ball
as to make it seem at rest, to expand and thus to give it an appearance
of more sensible motion. On the other hand, Vico agreed with the
Cartesians, especially Malebranche, as to the origin of ideas, which
he inclined to believe that God creates in us from time to time. He
also held with the Cartesians that the lower animals are automata;
and he agreed with all contemporary thought as to the subjectivity of
secondary qualities.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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