The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present dayJackson, William
Religion
The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present day
Jackson, William
Natural theology; Religion -- Philosophy; Religion and science
The Physiologist's last word is this--Sense impressions are signs, the
meaning of which we learn inductively by a process of self education.
"Illusions obviously depend upon mental processes which may be
described as false inductions.... There appears to me to be in reality
only a superficial difference between the 'conclusions' of logicians
and those inductive conclusions of which we recognise the result in
the conceptions we gain of the outer world through our sensations. The
difference chiefly depends upon the former conclusions being capable
of expression in words, while the latter are not; because, instead of
words, they only deal with sensations and the memory of sensations.
Indeed, it is just the impossibility of describing sensations, whether
actual or remembered, in words, which makes it so difficult to discuss
this department of psychology at all." (pp. 307, 8.) And again (p.
314), "There is a most striking analogy between the entire range of
processes which we have been discussing, and another System of Signs,
which is not given by nature but arbitrarily chosen, and which must
undoubtedly be learned before it is understood. I mean the words of our
mother tongue.
"Learning how to speak is obviously a much more difficult task than
acquiring a foreign language in after-life. First, the child has
to guess that the sounds it hears are intended to be signs at all;
next, the meaning of each separate sound must be found out, by the
same kind of induction as the meaning of the sensations of sight or
touch; and yet we see children by the end of their first year already
understanding certain words and phrases, even if they are not yet able
to repeat them. We may sometimes observe the same in dogs.
"Now this connection between Names and Objects, which demonstrably
must be _learnt_, becomes just as firm and indestructible as that
between Sensations and the Objects which produce them. We cannot help
thinking of the usual signification of a word, even when it is used
exceptionally in some other sense; we cannot help feeling the mental
emotions which a fictitious narrative calls forth, even when we know
that it is not true; just in the same way as we cannot get rid of the
normal signification of the sensations produced by any illusion of the
senses, even when we know that they are not real.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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