I quote this passage with pleasure, because one main objection brought against the possible existence of such a faculty is taken from the _negative form_ of the word Infinite. The Professor maintains that, as a question of Philology, Infinite signifies an affirmative idea. In his Lectures on Language, second series, p. 576. he writes thus. "There is no Infinite, we are told, for as there is a Finite, the Infinite has its limit in the Finite, it cannot be Infinite. Now all this is mere playing on words without thoughts. Why is infinite a negative idea? Because _infinite_ is derived from _finite_ by means of the negative particle _in_! But this is a mere accident, it is a fact in the history of language, and no more. The same idea may be expressed by the Perfect, the Eternal, the Self-existing, which are positive terms, or contain at least no negative element. That negative words may express positive ideas was known perfectly to Greek philosophers such as Chrysippus, and they would as little have thought of calling _immortal_ a negative idea as they would have considered _blind_ positive. The true idea of the Infinite is neither a negation nor a modification of any other idea. The Finite, on the contrary, is in reality the limitation or modification of the Infinite, nor is it possible, if we reason in good earnest, to conceive of the Finite in any other sense than as the shadow of the Infinite. Even Language will confess to this, if we cross-examine her properly." He adds a happy quotation from Roger Bacon: "'et dicitur infinitum non per privationem terminorum quantitatis, sed per negationem corruptionis et non esse.' Oxford of the nineteenth century need not be ashamed, as far as metaphysics are concerned, of Oxford of the thirteenth." Coleridge's theory of the Intuitive reason is well known to most readers. [89] Metaph. XII. 7. [90] Hamilton's Discussions, vol. 1. Art. 1. [91] Very few people have ever sate down and sturdily endeavoured to realize before their mind's eye, the distinct idea of any _other_ mind separate from themselves and independently subsistent. A short trial will shew the difficulty, perhaps impossibility of the proposed realization. Any one who tries and fails, may be glad to learn that eminent metaphysicians have retreated in despair from the task of justifying, by _argument_, our belief in any minds other than our own. To common sense, it may seem a natural inquiry whether this metaphysical failure holds _morally, in foro conscientiæ_, as a valid excuse for most men's neglect of other men's rights and interests? If _not_, it would appear that morality is a more delicate test of certainty, than some sorts of metaphysics. [t] For the information of some readers, and the entertainment of others, a few of the less popularized theories respecting Self-ness or Personal Identity are thrown into Additional Note A.