The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present dayJackson, William
Religion
The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present day
Jackson, William
Natural theology; Religion -- Philosophy; Religion and science
"We have already seen enough to answer the question whether it is
possible to maintain the natural and innate conviction that the quality
of our sensations, and especially our sensations of sight, give us a
true impression of corresponding qualities in the outer world. It is
clear that they do not. The question was really decided by Johannes
Müller's deduction from well ascertained facts of the law of specific
nervous energy. Whether the rays of the sun appear to us as colour,
or as warmth, does not at all depend upon their own properties, but
simply upon whether they excite the fibres of the optic nerve, or
those of the skin. Pressure upon the eyeball, a feeble current of
electricity passed through it, a narcotic drug carried to the retina
by the blood, are capable of exciting the sensation of light just as
well as the sunbeams. The most complete difference offered by our
several sensations, that namely between those of sight, of hearing,
of taste, of smell, and of touch--this deepest of all distinctions,
so deep that it is impossible to draw any comparison of likeness, or
unlikeness, between the sensations of colour and of musical tones--does
not, as we now see, at all depend upon the nature of the external
object, but solely upon the central connections of the nerves which
are affected.... But not only uneducated persons, who are accustomed
to trust blindly to their senses, even the educated, who know that
their senses may be deceived, are inclined to demur to so complete a
want of any closer correspondence in kind between actual objects and
the sensations they produce than the law I have just expounded. For
instance, natural philosophers long hesitated to admit the identity
of the rays of light and of heat, and exhausted all possible means of
escaping a conclusion which seemed to contradict the evidence of their
senses.
"Another example is that of Goethe, as I have endeavoured to show
elsewhere. He was led to contradict Newton's theory of colours,
because he could not persuade himself that white, which appears to
our sensation as the purest manifestation of the brightest light,
could be composed of darker colours. It was Newton's discovery of the
composition of light that was the first germ of the modern doctrine
of the true functions of the senses; and in the writings of his
contemporary, Locke, were correctly laid down the most important
principles on which the right interpretation of sensible qualities
depends. But, however clearly we may feel that here lies the difficulty
for a large number of people, I have never found the opposite
conviction of certainty derived from the senses so distinctly expressed
that it is possible to lay hold of the point of error: and the reason
seems to me to lie in the fact that beneath the popular notions on the
subject lie other and more fundamentally erroneous conceptions."
[101] Is there, asks Idealistic Scepticism, any outside world at all?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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