This account of our Belief in the Inductive Principle agrees, in effect, with the opinion of those who hold that our acceptance of its truth resembles our acceptance of Mathematical Truths in _two_ very important respects: (1) Its _Certitude_. To use Dr. Whewell's words; "We are as certain of it as of the truths of arithmetic and geometry. We cannot doubt that it must apply to all events past and future, in every part of the universe, just as truly as to those occurrences which we have ourselves observed. _What_ causes produce what effects;--what is the cause of any particular event;--what will be the effect of any peculiar process;--these are points on which experience may enlighten us. Observation and experience may be requisite, to enable us to judge respecting such matters. But that every event has _some_ cause, Experience cannot prove any more than she can disprove. She can add nothing to the evidence of the truth, however often she may exemplify it. This doctrine, then, cannot have been acquired by her teaching," Whewell's _Hist. of Scientific Ideas_, B. III. Cap. ii. (2) In the fact of its being _intuitive_; that is, as Mr. Fowler says, "connatural," or "native to the human mind." Whether we can trace the process through which it became one of the mental possessions characteristic of Mankind is a further question, and a very curious one. The subjects of improvement by education, and of the transmission of improvements thus acquired among men and the lower animals, belong in part to our next Chapter;--they are, of course, deeply interesting to every philanthropist, every promoter of true progress and wholesome civilization.