The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity: A Modern Philosophy of Life Developed by Scientific MethodsSteiner, Rudolf
Religion
The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity: A Modern Philosophy of Life Developed by Scientific Methods
Steiner, Rudolf
Anthroposophy; Free will and determinism; Knowledge, Theory of; Life
The truth is that the human mind never transcends the reality in which
it lives. Indeed, it has no need to transcend it, seeing that this
world contains everything that is required for its own explanation. If
philosophers declare themselves finally content when they have deduced
the world from principles which they borrow from experience and then
transplant into an hypothetical Beyond, the same satisfaction ought
to be possible, if these same principles are allowed to remain in this
world to which they belong anyhow. All attempts to transcend the world
are purely illusory, and the principles transplanted into the Beyond do
not explain the world any better than the principles which are immanent
in it. When thought understands itself, it does not demand any such
transcendence at all, for there is no thought-content which does not
find within the world a perceptual content, in union with which it can
form a real object. The objects of imagination, too, are contents which
have no validity, until they have been transformed into ideas that
refer to a perceptual content. Through this perceptual content they
have their place in reality. A concept the content of which is supposed
to lie beyond the world which is given to us, is an abstraction to
which no reality corresponds. Thought can discover only the concepts of
reality; in order to find reality itself, we need also perception. An
Absolute Being for which we invent a content, is a hypothesis which
no thought can entertain that understands itself. Monism does not
deny ideal factors; indeed, it refuses to recognise as fully real
a perceptual content which has no ideal counterpart, but it finds
nothing within the whole range of thought that is not immanent within
this world of ours. A science which restricts itself to a description
of percepts, without advancing to their ideal complements, is, for
Monism, but a fragment. But Monism regards as equally fragmentary
all abstract concepts which do not find their complement in percepts,
and which fit nowhere into the conceptual net that embraces the whole
perceptual world. Hence it knows no ideas referring to objects lying
beyond our experience and supposed to form the content of purely
hypothetical Metaphysics. Whatever mankind has produced in the way
of such ideas Monism regards as abstractions from experience, whose
origin in experience has been overlooked by their authors.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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