The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
Evil is either felt as evil, and in this case it means that it is not
realized, but that in its place is realized the good. The gambler of
the example, at the moment he knows he is doing himself economic harm,
does not play; his hand is held; and it is held, because to _know,_
in the practical sense, equals to _will_; and to know the harm of
gambling means to know it as harm, and so to dislike gambling. If he
take to dice or cards again, this arises because that knowledge is
obliterated in him, that is, because he changes his mind; and in this
case play is not looked upon any longer as harmful; it is willed,
and so at that instant again becomes the good for him, because it
satisfies one of his wants. The calumniator, if he understand the
idea that is passing through his mind, or rather the impulse that has
seized him, as calumny, is for that very reason repugnant to it and
does not pronounce those evil words: in that case indeed he is not
a calumniator, but an honest man who resists a temptation (and no
other definition of an honest man can be given). But if he pronounce
them, this means that the opposing repugnance was not present or is
no longer present: and therefore those words are no longer for him a
wicked act of calumny, but a simple satisfaction of a desire to amuse
himself, or to reject the evil that has been done to him, and therefore
a good. In the same way, he who asserts what is false, he who renders
himself guilty of error, if he be aware of himself as frivolous or a
charlatan or disloyal, would be silent: if he talk and write and print
false insinuations, this happens either because the will for truth
does not exist in him, or is for the time being suppressed, and with
it the desire to seek it out and to diffuse it; that is to say, for
that will has been substituted the other of withdrawing from a painful
labour, or of obtaining easy praise and gain; so, for one good has been
substituted another. As a rule, it is admitted that we will the good
and do evil. "I do not do the good that I will, and I do the evil
that I do not will" (οὐ γὰρ ὂ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὂ οὐ θέλω κακὸν
τοῦτο πράσσω), said St. Paul.[1] But it is a question of psychological
confusion, owing to which a series of moments and alternatives is
simplified into one single act, inexistent because contradictory.
[Sidenote: _Affirmative judgments of evil as negative judgments._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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