The relation established receives further light from the generally admitted theory of the necessary precedence of the _feelings_ as condition for the volitional act. The volitional act is preceded by a jostling multiplicity of volitions, by a swarm of passions and desires, which it dominates; and therefore it may seem that it follows, not the volition, but something different from the volition, to be called _feeling._ It is certainly different, but only because it is the _plural_ of that _singular._ The nature of the passions and desires in respect to the volitional act has not been clearly elucidated, and this is another of the reasons that have caused the customary category of "feeling" to appear and to be retained. [Sidenote: _Polipathicism and apathicism._] Finally and always through the established relation, the two opposed theories concerning the passions are excluded: that which makes the efficacious explanation of practical life to consist in giving free course to the passions, holding them all to be sacred as such: this theory could be called _polipathicism_; the other, which makes it consist of the eradication and destruction of all the passions, in order to give place to the exclusive domination of reason, of rational will, or of the will that really is will, and could therefore be called _apathicism._ Polipathicism has the defect of not taking account among the passions of that which is passion _par excellence,_ and which alone becomes actual, driving away the others: the will. Apathicism naturally possesses the opposite defect and takes account only of the will, and therefore not of that either, for the will becomes impotent when alone, just as in the other case it becomes a chaotic jumble of all the passions. [Sidenote: _Erroneousness of both opposed theses._]