The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
This concept of the _vocation_ has a mystical and religious origin and
preserves that form; but it is clear that by means of the previous
considerations we have divested it of that form and reduced it to a
scientific concept. The individual is not a "monad" or a "real," he
is not a "soul" created by a God all in a moment and all of a piece;
the individual is the historical situation of the universal spirit at
every instant of time, and, therefore, the sum of the habits due to
the historical situations. Those modes of conceiving and talking of
one _and the same_ individual in two _different_ situations, or of two
_different_ individuals in the _same_ situation, are to be avoided,
because individual and situation are all one. But when the individual
has been thus defined, it remains none the less true that each
individual must direct his life according to pre-existing habits and
personal dispositions, and thus we discover the true meaning of the
mythologies and religions that have been mentioned, and the struggles
to find the suitable employment can be expressed with the words that
religion has taught us when we were children: the "vocation" and the
special "mission" that is allotted to us in life, until the last giving
of accounts and the words of dismissal and repose: _Nunc dimitte servum
tuum, Domine!_ We are the children of that Reality which generates us
and knows more than we, the Reality of which religions have caught a
glimpse and called it God, father, and eternal wisdom.
[Sidenote: _Misunderstandings as to the rights of individuality. Evil
individuality._]
The affirmation of the rights that belong to individuality in the
practical field has several times assumed and still assumes (in our
time, more than in the past, owing to materialism and naturalism) a
form, no longer symbolical and mystical, but wrong and irrational, that
it is desirable to remark upon here, always in order to avoid possible
equivoques. Indeed many look upon the respect due to their own beings
as due to their caprice, that is to say, to what is on the contrary
the negation of being: the right of the individual as the right to
commit follies, or to a disaggregate individuality. The declared
necessity of temperament for character is exchanged for admiration of
temperament considered in itself, which, as such, is neither admirable
nor blameworthy; but when separated from character becomes vice and
folly. Hence the admiration that has even become a literary fashion,
for the dissolute, for the violent, for homicides, for the criminals of
the public prisons, illustrated by a few courageous and energetic souls
among them, whereas they are as a rule weak, vile, and turbid.
[Sidenote: _False doctrines as to the connection of virtues and vices._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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