of action, or of prevailing thought or prevailing action, these not superior to those, for they are collaborators.--Thus the discussions as to whether human progress be moral or intellectual, or whether the propelling force be the practical and economic activity, or philosophy, or religion (Buckle, Kidd, etc.), are shown to be vain. [Sidenote: _New pragmatism: life conditioning Philosophy._] It is rather to be considered that from this bond between theory and practice is obtained a pragmatism of a new sort, of which the pragmatists have never thought, or at least have not been able to distinguish from the others and to give it value. If Life condition Thought, we have in this the apodictic demonstration of the always historically conditioned form of every thought; not only of Art, which is always the art of a time, of a soul, of a moment; but also of Philosophy which can solve only those problems presented by Life. Every philosophy reflects and cannot but reflect the preoccupations, as they are called, of a definite historical moment; and this, not in the quality of its _solutions_ (in which case it would be and is indeed bad philosophy), but in the quality of its _problems._ Thus it is at once contingent and eternal, mortal and immortal, extratemporal and living only in time and history. [Sidenote: _Deductive confirmation of the two forms and deductive exclusion of the third feeling._] Finally, with the establishment of the duality-unity of the theoretical and the practical, we have demonstrated that which at the beginning of the exposition had only been asserted and presupposed: namely, why a _practical_ form of the spirit must be placed beside the theoretical,[5] and why there is no _third_ form beyond these, whether it be called _feeling_ or by any other name.[6] The theoretical form postulates the practical, because the subject postulates the object; but the spirit does not postulate a third form intermediate between the two, or unity of the two, because it is itself precisely mediator and unity of itself, _subject-object._ [1] Section I. [2] Section II. [3] Section I. c. 3. [4] Section I. c. 4. [5] Section I. c. 1. [6] Section I. c. 2. SECOND PART THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS SPECIAL FORMS FIRST SECTION THE TWO PRACTICAL FORMS: ECONOMIC AND ETHIC I DISTINCTION OF THE TWO FORMS IN THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS [Sidenote: _The utilitarian or economic form, and the moral or ethical form._]