The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
Such a refusal (analogous to our analysis of the utilitarian theory)
cannot take place, save in three ways: that is, in so far as value is
denied to the useful, either as _practical_ concept, or as _positive_
concept, or as _philosophical_ concept. Here too we naturally
do not take count of the theses of the materialists or of the
intellectualists, which (especially those of the former) have raged in
the field of Economy not less than in that of Ethic, giving rise to
insane attempts to explain the useful on mechanical principles, or with
the contingencies of historical evolution.
[Sidenote: _The useful as the means or as theoretical fact._]
The useful (it has been said) is nothing but the _means_ to obtain a
certain end. For example, if I take a walk every day with a view to
keeping myself in good health, the daily walk is the suitable means and
is therefore useful; if, on the contrary, I find that it makes me ill,
this means that it is not the suitable means and it would be, and I
should declare it to be, useless or harmful. Now by the demonstration
given above, it is known that means and end are indistinguishable in
the _practical,_ for what is called means is nothing but the actual
situation (and the knowledge of it), from which arises the practical
act, and to which that act corresponds. Thus it is most possible to
separate the means from the end; but in so doing, the consideration of
the practical act is abandoned, and we pass to that of its theoretical
antecedent; and if the mere theoretical antecedent be called "useful"
or "practical" in ordinary speech (remembering the practical act,
to which it has been or it is presumed that it may be united) then a
metaphor is employed, against which there is nothing to be said. Those,
then, who define the useful as the means should once for all realize
that with such a definition they remove that concept from the circle
of the Philosophy of the practical and transport it into Logic, where
the relation of means and end is the very same as that of cause and
effect, and it again becomes part of the theory of empirical concepts,
in which cause and effect are wont to be posited as terms separately
conceivable. This has been more or less consciously recognized, when
the useful has been defined as the _technical,_ for we know that the
technical is nothing but knowledge thus made into a metaphor, owing to
the relation that it has or is presumed to be capable of having, with
an action that has been done or is about to be done.
[Sidenote: _Technical and hypothetical imperatives._]
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