A second erroneous but unavoidable consequence of the conception of useful and moral as coordinated concepts is that while, according to that theory, there can be ethical actions economically disinterested or indifferent, so there can be actions that are useful and _morally indifferent._ The indifferent would not be those that are merely economic, and, therefore, neither moral nor immoral, which we have recognized as the necessary precedent of moral actions, reappearing always when a return is made to the state of innocence, or as soon as the moral conscience is abolished or suspended. They would on the contrary be economic actions that should persist as such, that is, as ingenuous and amoral, when the moral consciousness is already kindled, and consequently in the very circle of such a conscientiousness. They are altogether inadmissible when thus conceived, and to have admitted them is equivalent to annulling morality, as the recognition of the right of subjects to rebel at their pleasure would be to annul sovereignty, or a burlesque contract containing the clause that each party should be free not to observe the other clauses agreed upon, at his pleasure. Indifferent actions do not exist, either for economy or for morality, and those to which such a character is generally attributed are, as we know, indifferentiated, not indifferent, and always differentiable when more closely examined. Only he who places the useful and the moral, side by side with one another, separate and impenetrable, is of necessity led to conceive of useful actions morally indifferent, and as such _licit or permissible._ Hence it also happens that moral actions also seem to be _obligatory_ compared with the first; and that, in order to obtain equilibrium at the other extremity, ultramoral or more than moral actions, called _meritorious or supererogatory,_ are placed side by side with obligatory actions that hold the mean. But morality does not grant leave _not to do,_ nor prizes for _doing more than was required_; it simply imposes _doing,_ doing always what is morally good, always realizing the universal, in ordinary as in extraordinary life, on the occasions that occur every day, every hour, every minute, as in those that occur every year, every ten years, every century. Nothing is indifferent to economy in its sphere and nothing to morality in its sphere: in it, economic actions with their premoral character do not persist, but only moral actions subsist. Economicity is certainly the concrete form of morality; but it is never an element that possesses a value of its own in the moral life. [Sidenote: _Comparison with the relation of art and philosophy._]