The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
It is not surprising that such propositions examined in their truth
appear in one respect arbitrary and in another tautological. But it is
not thus that they are examined, and it is not thus that propositions
of mathematics are ever examined, for their value lies solely in the
service that they render. Certainly Ricardo's law relating to land of
varying fertility is nothing but the definition of lands of various
fertility, in the same way that Gresham's law relating to bad money is
nothing but the definition of bad money. The same may be said of any
other economic law, as, for example, that every protective tariff is
destruction of riches, or that a demand for commodities is not a demand
for labour, since these, like the preceding, are simply definitions
of the protective tariff, of the demand for commodities, and of the
demand for labour. And it could be proved of all of them that they are
arbitrary, because the concepts of land, tariffs, commodities, money,
and so on, are arbitrary, and because they become necessary only when
that arbitrariness has been admitted as a postulate. But the same
demonstration can be given of any theorem in Geometry; since it is not
less arbitrary and tautological, that the measure of a quadrilateral
should be equal to the base multiplied by the height, or that the
sum of the squares of a cathetic should be equal to the square of
the hypotenuse. This does not prevent Geometry from being Geometry,
or negate the fact that without it we should not have been able to
build the house in which we dwell, nor to measure this star upon which
we live, nor the others that revolve around it or around which we
revolve. Thus, it would be impossible to find one's way in empirical
reality without these economic formulæ, and that would happen which
happened when economic science was still in its infancy; namely, that
by its means measures of government were adopted, which were admirably
suited to produce in the highest degree those evils which it was
thought could be avoided by its help, a misfortune of which the Spanish
government in Lombardy or in the Province of Naples in the seventeenth
century, with its _cries_ and its _pragmatics_ in economic and
financial matters, has left most excellent examples. Or what happens
now, when ignorance, or deceitful interest, which profits by ignorance,
proposes or causes to be adopted ruinous measures under the appearance
of _publica salus,_ arguing that they are good, or that they are good
for different reasons than those for which they could be maintained.
Such, for instance, would be the proposal for fresh expenditure on
public works that are useless or of little use during a period of
economic depression in a country, and instead of relieving, increase
the general depression; or the increase of protective tariffs, when
industrial progress is slow, which ought to encourage industry, but on
the contrary produce an industry that is unstable and artificial, in
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account