_Formal_ Ethic, in the new sense, or as it would be better called, tautological Ethic, might be called _formalistic,_ owing to its thus falling back into material, heteronomous and utilitarian Ethic, since _formalism_ here (as in Æsthetic and Logic) is the caricature of formality, and almost a sort of materiality. In maintaining _formal_ Ethic we do not wish that it should be _formalistic_; that is, that it should be again covertly material. And we wish that formal Ethic should also be material, always understanding by this that it must give, not the mere logical condition of the ethical principle, but _this ethical principle itself_ in its concreteness, determining what moral volition is in its reality. II THE ETHICAL FORM AS ACTUATION OF THE SPIRIT IN UNIVERSAL [Sidenote: _Tautological Ethic and its connection with Philosophy, either partial or discontinuous._] If the strange idea of an ethical principle that should be formal, in the sense of its not being known exactly what it is and how it is justified, has ever been able to arise, this is due to two erroneous philosophical conceptions, of which one can be called _partial,_ the other _discontinuous_ philosophy. According to the first conception, man is capable of knowing something of reality, certainly, but not all: he perceives and arranges the data of experience by means of the categories, but he is aware of the limitation of his thought and of the impossibility of attaining to the heart of the real, which he does, it is true, end by attaining in a certain way, but only with the heart, not with thought. This being stated, and coming to the case of Ethic, man hears the voice of conscience in himself, the command of the moral law; he cannot think of any sophism to escape it: but precisely what that law is, he is unable to say; the idea of a divine ordinance of the world which presents itself to his spirit, may also be affirmed by the heart, but never by thought. The second conception is confounded by some thinkers with the first and becomes partial philosophy or agnosticism; but if we observe closely, it is distinct from the other. For here it is not actually asserted that the foundation of morality is unknowable, but it is said to be unknowable in the circle of Ethic, or that such knowledge goes beyond that circle. Ethic establishes the moral law, deduces or arranges beneath it ethical precepts and by means of them judges single actions. Ethic is ignorant as to whether that law really exists, or what may be its precise universal content. It hands this problem over to Metaphysic, or to general Philosophy, which solves it in its own way, or is presumed to be capable of solving it. In this conception, then, there arises a question as to competence and hierarchy between thought and thought, between particular and general philosophy; whereas, in the former, is affirmed the absolute incompetence of thought. [Sidenote: _Rejection of both these conceptions._]