been filled with a moral content, that is to say, an ethical form has been given to the practical activity. The double sense of the terms "rights" and "morality" is in this way preserved in words but denied in fact. [Sidenote: _Duality of positive and ideal, historical and natural rights, etc.; and absurd attempts at unification and co-ordination._] The dual sense of the terms is also affirmed by the very ancient distinction between _positive and ideal, historical_ and _natural_ rights, _right_ and _justice,_ or, as it has also been formulated, between the _two different justices,_ realistic and idealistic, fruitful in conjunction. Natural rights, with their homonyms just stated, besides the generically practical significations that we have already examined, have also had the narrower one of ethical ideal or morality; and therefore it cannot cause astonishment that it should appear now conjoined with, now detached from positive rights. But how joined and disjoined? For us it is a question of degrees, whence the positivity of both forms is recognized: the second of these is included in the first: the ideal right or morality (if it be right, and not simply abstract excogitation willed by no one, or vague desire) is both positive and historical. But those who posited the distinction without being able to make it definite and so to dominate it were led to conceive one or the other term as negative; and therefore both as negative between themselves and existing only in a third: which meant to reannul the distinction by reducing it to abstract contradiction. If one of the two were conceived as negative, either the ideal justice (that is, the seriousness of moral strength) was denied and turned to ridicule, or positive justice, that is, the seriousness of volitional strength, was presented as something turbid and impure and at best as a human imperfection, to which it was advisable to resign oneself since it would disappear in a society of perfect men or in a future life of perfection. Juridical activity became something contingent and mortal. Matters were even worse, if it were found impossible to eliminate it with similar religious, apocalyptic, or millenary fancies. The negative was then conceived as positive or co-ordinated with the positive: hence incredible logical divisions of rights into forms or species of _moral_ and _immoral rights, of just_ and _unjust_ rights, in which the species has the function of _negation of the genus,_ almost as though the race of horses were to be divided into two kinds: _dead_ and _living_ horses! Unjust or immoral rights are not rights, but a contradiction of them, and if we sometimes describe in this way a real and effective juridical act (an economic act), it is necessary to observe that the denomination is given from the point of view of a superior form of activity. Rights in themselves as rights, understood positively, are never immoral, but only _amoral._