For the reasons already indicated, it is not necessary to pause over the juridical ideas of the utilitarians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whose last celebrated representatives were, in England, Bentham, Austin and Spencer. The German Kirchmann is to be identified with the utilitarian tendency. He reduces morality to the _respect_ inspired, not by the law, but by the _person_ of the legislator, a respect afterwards converted into respect for the law "owing to a peculiarity of human nature, as the result of long custom and exercise." According to this view, rights are defined as "a union of pleasure and morality, whether the first calls the second to its aid or the second the first, in cases when the isolated efficacy of either should prove insufficient." Thus rights are declared to be, not an original principle, but the simple union of two different elements. Jhering failed to surpass utilitarianism, notwithstanding his profound juridical knowledge and his lively intellect. He attempted to impart an original character to his utilitarian theory, by declaring that it was _objective_ in respect to the usual utilitarian theories, but he always remained under the obligation that he had undertaken, of showing how the purest ideality of Ethic could be fortified with such, a conception. The distinctions drawn by Jhering between recompense, compulsion, duty, and love, since they lack a foundation, vacillate and prove but little convincing.[23] [Sidenote: _Recent writers of treatises._]