necessary for the maintenance of life in common, leaving to other forces the task of regulating what is most individual in life." And so on, though it seems that this is enough.[25] [Sidenote: _Strident contradictions. Stammler._] Such are the contradictions in which the Philosophy of rights has struggled for about two centuries. Rights do not seem to be identical with Ethic, but they also do not seem to be simply different; they seem to be at once identical and different, but yet it has been found impossible to fix the element of difference with the concepts of external, of compulsion and others such. The thought of a difference between the two forms of activity has not been further eliminated; but neither has it been transformed and absorbed. This is a morbid condition, of which the gravest symptom is the logical absurdity of the aforesaid two rights and two justices. Rümelin talks of the pure ideal justice, which selects from the evidence and judges on the basis of immediate impressions of feeling; and of a realistic, rational, empirical, disciplined and developed justice: two justices that must however act together.[26] Others, seeking relations between those two concepts from a single fact and failing to conquer the difficulty, force logic by distinguishing between _concept_ and _ideal_ of rights, or (as Vanni said) between _logical_ concept and concept of the _rational exigencies_ of rights: as though a concept could be truly logical, if it do not derive from rational exigencies, and as if these can be valid, if they be not the concept itself. Worse still, Stammler affirms the identity of rights with moral rights, and of rights alone with immoral rights, arriving at the already criticized division of effective rights (_Gesetzes_) into two classes. It "is either right rights (_richtiges Recht_) or not; and right rights are effective, whose content of will possesses the property of being _right._ Hence, right rights stand to effective rights as _species to genus._"[27] To meditate upon this plan of division is more than sufficient to produce the conviction of the failure of the Philosophy of rights, as it has been developed and as it could be developed with the practical presuppositions hitherto admitted. As the result of the direction of studies, from Thomas to the most recent, there remains nothing but the problem itself, as originated by the definitions of Thomas, and become certainly more acute and difficult, owing to later disputes and inquiries, but never solved. [Sidenote: _The value of law._] V. Less attention has been bestowed upon the concept of _law,_ upon which it was impossible to obtain full light, on the one hand before the theory of abstract concepts had been developed (representative of class) in their difference from the universal, and on the other before preconceptions as to the necessary social and political character of laws had been discarded. [Sidenote: _In antiquity._]