The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
It is well, however, to indicate one among the many sources from which
is derived the illusion of this distinction and separation, effectively
inexistent. A volitional act, which is a process of some duration,
may be interrupted and substituted for other volitional acts; it may
declare itself again and again begin its work (although this will
always be more or less modified), and this may give occasion to new
interruptions and new beginnings. It seems that in this way the will
stands on one side, as something formed and definite, and that on the
other execution pursues its way and is subject to the most varied
accidents. But volition and execution proceed with equal and indeed
with one single step. What we will we execute; the volition changes as
the execution changes. In the same way, when we are engaged upon a work
of art, on a long poem for instance, the illusion arises of an abstract
conception or plan, which the poet carries out as he versifies. But
every poet knows that a poem is not created from an abstract plan, that
the initial poetical image is not without rhythm and verse, and that
it does not need rhythm and verse applied to it afterwards. He knows
that it is in reality a primitive intuition-expression, in which all
is determined and nothing is determined, and what has been already
intuified is already expressed, and what will afterwards be expressed
will only afterwards be intuified. The initial intuition is certainly
not an abstract plan, but a living and vital germ; and so is the
volitional act.
[Sidenote: _Distinction between action and succession or event._]
When, therefore, it is affirmed that a volition is truly such, only
when it produces effects, or that a volition is to be judged by
its results, it is impossible not to assent, as we assent that an
unexpressed expression or an unversified verse is neither an expression
nor a verse. But in this signification only, because those propositions
have sometimes assumed another, which on the contrary it is needful
resolutely to reject. This is that in them action (will-action) has
been confused with _succession or event._ Now, if volition coincide
with action, it does not and cannot coincide with _event._
[Sidenote: _Volition and event._]
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