philosophical truth), namely, that we must abandon rules, that is, face the individual case, which, as such, is always irregular. [Sidenote: _Jurisprudence as casuistry._] But if a further proof be wanted of the necessity and perpetuity of maxims and of casuistry, observe how these also persist in literary form, as laws, where this form is not eliminable. _Laws,_ as we have seen, are not simple rules, but are based upon _formulæ of rules,_ and must of necessity make explicit in them decisions as to doing and not doing. Jurisprudence is the Casuistic of law, or all the labour of so-called interpretation, which is at bottom the excogitation of new rules. All know that not only is Jurisprudence not of itself legislative, but that it cannot even determine the volitional act of the Statesman, nor the sentence, or decision upon the particular case, a decision which the judge creates upon each occasion. But no one would seriously think of suppressing the work and the function of those _casuists,_ or judicial experts, a function which, since it has always existed and continues to exist, cannot but answer to a social need. It is possible to predict a form of social life, less complicated and weighty, in which that function would have less scope, but whatever be the case as regards this prediction, the casuistry of judicial experts will continue so long as there are laws and rules, that is to say, always. [1] _Ricordi politici e civili,_ n. xliv. (in _Opere inedite_(2), Firenze, 1857; p. 97). [2] _Scritti inediti,_ ed. Del Giudice, Napoli, 1862, p. 12. [3] Letter to the d'Épinay, 5th September 1772. [4] _Mémoires,_ ed. Paris, Gamier, s.a., i pp. 3-4. VIII CRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS BY PHILOSOPHY OF THE DOMAIN OF PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION AND OF ITS DERIVATIVES In demonstrating the legitimacy and necessity of practical description and of its derivatives, Regolistic and Casuistic, we have not fulfilled, as it were, our whole knightly duty, which binds us to that discipline, which we have been obliged to maltreat so exceedingly, and shall further maltreat, when it has been or shall be presented as a philosophical method. It is now necessary to defend its existence against the invasion of philosophy, or rather of philosophers. We must make it obvious that if the empiricists and psychologists, who swell themselves out to philosophers, are bunglers, those too are bunglers who claim to solve empirical questions philosophically. Perhaps they are bunglers less worthy of pardon, because it is part of philosophy to know itself clearly, and consequently its own limits. [Sidenote: _First form: tendency to generalize._]