The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.Lewes, George Henry
Philosophy
The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind.
Lewes, George Henry
Mind and body; Psychophysiology
134. Having brought together the manifold resemblances, and the no
less marked diversities, we must ask what is their significance? Do
the resemblances imply a community of origin, an universal kinship?
If so, the diversities will be nothing more than the divergences
which have been produced by variations in the Life-history of the
several groups. Or--taking the alternative view--do the diversities
imply radical differences of origin? If so, the resemblances will be
nothing more than the inevitable analogies resulting from Organized
Substance being everywhere somewhat similar in composition, and similar
in certain phases of evolution. To state the former position in the
simplest way, we may assume that of two masses of protoplasm having
a common parentage, one, by the accident of assimilating a certain
element not brought within the range of the other, thereby becomes so
differentiated as to form the starting-point of a series of evolutions
widely divergent from those possible to its congener; and at each stage
of evolution the introduction of a new element (made possible by that
stage) will form the origin of a new variation. It is thus feasible to
reduce all organic forms to a primordial protoplasm, in the evolutions
of which successive differentiations have been established. On the
other hand, it is equally feasible to assume that the existence of
radical differences must be invoked to account for the possibility of
the successive differentiations.
135. The hunt after resemblances has led to much mistaken speculation;
and with reference to the topic now before us, it may be urged,
that although by attaching ourselves to the points of community, in
disregard of the diversities, we may make it appear that all animals
have a common parentage, and that plants and animals are merely
divergent groups of the same prototype, a rigorous logic will force us
onwards, and compel us to admit that a kinship no less real unites
the organic with the inorganic world. For upon what principle are we
to pause at the cell or protoplasm? If by a successive elimination
of differences we reduce all organisms to the cell, we must go on
and reduce the cell itself to the chemical elements out of which it
is constructed; and inasmuch as these elements are all common to the
inorganic world, the only difference being one of synthesis, we reach a
result which is the stultification of all classification, namely, the
assertion of a kinship which is universal. We must bear in mind that
all things may be reduced to a common root by simply disregarding their
differences. All things are alike when we set aside their unlikeness.
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